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Abstract: We present experimental evidence consistent with statistical discrim-
ination in a public good and group formation game. We find that behavior is
correlated with race and, to a lesser extent, gender, and people use race to predict
behavior when no other information is available. When information on behavior
is provided, people disregard personal characteristics completely. These charac-
teristics are also disregarded when individual behavior is induced to break the
correlation between characteristics and behavior. That is, people disregard race
and gender even when observed behavior is unusual but relevant to payoffs. Fi-
nally, our experiments show that sorting into groups has dramatic implications on
cooperation. Overall payoffs are higher when sorting is possible than when groups
are randomly assigned. This only occurs, however, when personal characteristics
are known. Higher payoffs are attained at the cost of an equitable distribution.
∗Petrie thanks the Office of the Advancement of Women and the Office of the Vice
President for Research at Georgia State University for financial support. We also thank
Krawee Ackaramongkolrotn, John List, Todd Swarthout, and seminar participants at
the Southern Economics Association meetings, the International Economics Science
Association meetings, Georgia State University, and Georgetown University.
1. Introduction
Without information on the reputation or performance of others, people may turn
to physical appearance as the criteria for forming impressions or choosing associ-
ations. For example, people may withdraw from or never enter into interactions
with certain segments of the population because of these impressions. Initial per-
ceptions might persist even in the face of evidence contradicting them. In the long
run, individuals in society may suffer persistent losses due to exclusion if enough
sorting takes place.
How important are these types of (mis)perceptions in determining group com-
position and economic outcomes? This research uses laboratory experiments to
examine how and why observable characteristics and salient performance signals
are used by people to sort into groups. We conjecture that people may focus on
personal characteristics, such as gender or race, to choose group members because
they lack better information on future performance. The difficulty of identifying
whether personal characteristics have an impact on who is chosen as a group mem-
ber is that personal characteristics and performance can be correlated (or thought
to be). For example, if men are better performers and we observe a preference
for men as group members, is this because they are better performers or because
people prefer to be in groups with men? Our experiments test this hypothesis by
manipulating the information made available to subjects and by inducing behav-
ior to break the correlation between performance and personal characteristics. We
do this by making personal characteristics irrelevant or bad predictors of behavior
and therefore irrelevant to payoffs. Making appearance a bad predictor of behav-
ior is an important robustness test of statistical discrimination, since no room is
left for self-confirming biases.
We use a repeated linear public goods game. Repeated public goods exper-
iments are a natural environment in which to study group formation because
payments in the experiment are a function of both individual and group behavior.
The more cooperative are the other group members, the more money a person
makes. In our experimental treatments, subjects are shown, in a surprise sorting
game, either the digital photographs of others in the experiment or information
on past performance (or both). Subjects are asked to choose who they would
like to have in their group. One treatment breaks the correlation between per-
formance and appearance, and this allows us to identify discrimination for other
than statistical reasons.
Our approach is novel in that it manipulates information or the equilibrium
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at the experimental level within the same game to identify sources of discrim-
ination. Not only can we cleanly distinguish if discrimination is statistical or
taste-based, but by altering the incentives to create the necessary counterfactu-
als, we can directly observe the impact of sorting on performance and payoffs. Our
experimental environment is strategic and relevant to understanding how groups
or neighborhoods form.
Several experimental studies have shown the social context of decisions can
affect outcomes (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Bohnet and Frey, 1999; Burnham,
2003; Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, Fehr and Gintis, 2004). Indeed, specific
characteristics of a partner, such as gender, beauty and ethnicity, can affect de-
cisions (Andreoni and Petrie, 2006; Castillo and Carter, 2006; Eckel and Wilson,
2003; Ferraro and Cummings, 2006; Hammermesh and Biddle, 1994; Mobius and
Rosenblat, 2006; and Petrie, 2004). There is also experimental evidence showing
that strategic behavior is affected by gender (Croson and Gneezy, 2004). Finally,
Slonim (2004) shows that there is significant against one’s gender discrimination
in a trust game where partners are chosen.
There have been several studies to discern the nature of discrimination, i.e.,
whether it is taste-based (Becker, 1975) or statistical (Arrow, 1973; Phelps, 1972).
The literature on sport economics is mixed. In sports, performance is measured
more accurately and therefore regressions of wages on race are less susceptible to
omitted variable problems. However, there is evidence of wage discrimination in
basketball but not in baseball (Kahn, 1991). Audit studies suggest findings con-
sistent with taste-based discrimination (Riach and Rich, 2002), but there are con-
cerns about treatment effect biases (Heckman, 1998). Bertrand and Mullainathan
(2004) improve upon audit studies by creating fake resumes and find that those
with black-sounding names tend to be discriminated against. While their study
finds evidence of discrimination, it cannot identify its nature since resumes are
imperfect measures of performance.
Knowles, Persico and Todd (2001) develop a test of taste-based discrimina-
tion in police car searches. They observe that the success rate of police searches
must be equalized across drivers’ races in a matching-pennies model of police in-
terdiction. They find evidence of statistical discrimination but not taste-based
discrimination. A more robust test of taste-based discrimination was suggested
by Anwar and Fang (2006). They also find evidence of statistical but not taste-
based discrimination. However, as the authors acknowledge, their test favors the
hypothesis of no taste-based discrimination. Levitt (2004) exploits the changes
in incentives in the Weakest Link television show to test for alternative theories
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of discrimination. He does not find evidence of race or gender discrimination but
of age discrimination. List (2006) also finds evidence of age discrimination by
examining partner choice in the television show Friend or Foe.
An alternative way to test for taste-based discrimination is the use of economic
experiments. Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) show evidence of statistical discrimi-
nation in Israel. They observed that people mistrusted men of Eastern origin but
otherwise did not make a difference when given the opportunity to make transfers
to them. List (2004) also provides evidence of statistical discrimination in a sport
cards market by collecting additional evidence with experiments. He finds that
difference in bargaining behavior can be explained by difference in the distribution
of reservation valuation and willingness to pay. Similar to Fershtman and Gneezy,
he uses allocation exercises to test for taste-based discrimination and finds no
evidence of it.
Our approach is similar to List (2006) in that we look at discrimination in
sorting and to Fershtman and Gneezy and List (2004) in that we utilize economic
experiments to gather information otherwise not readily available in economic
transactions. To directly test for alternative theories of discrimination, our ap-
proach is different in that we use the same game and manipulate the information
available to subjects. Previous approaches indirectly test for statistical discrim-
ination since no payoff-relevant information is provided to subjects. We adopt
this approach because theories of statistical discrimination contend that discrim-
ination is a reaction to imperfect information. More information could eliminate
any evidence of discrimination or confirm stereotypes. This is why breaking the
correlation between appearance and performance is so important. By creating a
counterfactual on expected behavior, if discrimination remains, it must be taste-
based.
Our approach has some advantages. First, by keeping the game constant we
reduce the possibility of experimental treatment effect biases or lack of compa-
rability between strategic games and allocation exercises. Second, even in the
absence of experimental treatment effects, it is not clear if the presence or ab-
sence of discrimination found in allocation exercises is the relevant information
on preferences in the strategic environment we study. For instance, people might
be indifferent to the race of those receiving their charity but not indifferent to
the composition of their neighborhood. A person might be willing to pay a pre-
mium to live in a homogenous neighborhood and simultaneously give to charities
that target groups different than their own. For this reason, we directly test for
discrimination in the sorting task.
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Our experiment is based on a series of repeated public good games with a
surprise group formation stage before playing the last rounds of the public goods
game. In the surprise group formation stage subjects are allowed to rank potential
partners using an incentive-based mechanism. It is in this stage where informa-
tion availability is manipulated. Subjects are shown the average past behavior
of potential partners, the photo of potential partners or both. Finally, since be-
havior could be highly correlated with appearance, we induce behavior to break
this correlation and test the effect of information when behavior is unusual. This
treatment makes information on appearance a poor predictor of behavior and
therefore irrelavant under the null hypothesis of statistical discrimination.1 Note
that taste-based discrimination theories would have a hard time explaining why
people disregard information on appearance once the relevant information on per-
formance is available. That is, we argue that regardless of the fact that a subject’s
beliefs on future behavior might be correct or not or observed by the researcher
or not, taste-based discrimination should be immune to information on perfor-
mance. We consider this approach — manipulating information and performance
to test the nature of discrimination — to be one of the strengths of our design since
measuring expectations is not a trivial task (see Manski, 2004).
We find evidence consistent with statistical discrimination or stereotyping, but
not taste-based discrimination. First, we find that people of different backgrounds
do behave differently. In particular, non-white subjects, including blacks and
some other ethnicities, give significantly less than other subjects and, therefore,
make less desirable partners. Second, we find that subjects use information on
appearance to rank potential partners. Black subjects are ranked two ranks lower
than other subjects when no information on past behavior is provided. Even
though other non-white ethnicities give statistically the same amount as Blacks,
they are not ranked lower. Under closer inspection, we find that only white
subjects rank black subjects lower than others. On average, black subjects are
ranked four ranks lower than other subjects by white subjects. Finally, we find
that appearance is irrelevant for ranking people once information on average past
behavior is available. This is true even when behavior is induced.
The experiments also show that the ability to sort into groups can have sig-
1It is possible that some evidence of discrimination remains if measures of performance are
available and performace is made orthogonal to appearance. This can happen if subjects believe
that the performance of a group is measured relatively poorly (Phelps, 1972). Our experiments
gather enough information to test for this alternative hypothesis. We do not find evidence of
this.
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nificant effects on the distribution of earnings. We find that sorting increases
contributions across all groups but more so for those groups composed of the
most preferred subjects. This amounts to an increase in average earnings but
also in the disparity of earnings. Finally, our experiments show that sorting into
groups is effective in increasing cooperation only when people know the identity
of their partners. Sorting based on past behavior only has no discernible effect on
either average payoffs or the distribution of payoffs.
2. Experimental Design
We use a linear public goods game to explore discrimination in group formation.
Each subject must decide how to divide a 25 token endowment between a private
investment and a public investment. Each token placed in the private investment
yields a return of 2 cents to the subject. Each token placed in the public investment
yields a return of αi to the subject and every other member of the group. In three
of the four treatments, αi = 1 cent. There are 20 subjects in each experimental
session. Subjects are randomly assigned to a five-person group and play 10 rounds
with that same group. At the end of each round, subjects learn their payoff, πs,
and the total number of tokens contributed to the public investment by the group,
G. In total, subjects play three 10-round sequences, and each 10-round sequence
is with the same group. At the end of the first 10-round sequence, subjects
are again randomly assigned to a new five-person group, and at the end of the
second 10-round sequence, subjects are asked to choose their group for the final
10 investment decisions. This is a surprise. Subjects do not know they will be
asked to choose their group before this point in the experiment. No personal
information is revealed in the first 20 rounds of the experiment.
In order to create an incentive for people to reveal who they would prefer to
be matched with, we create the following game. Subjects rank all the other 19
subjects in the session from most preferred to least preferred. We provide subjects
with some information on the other subjects in the room to use for ranking. The
information is either the average amount contributed to the public investment
during the second 10-round sequence, the subject’s photo, or both. Subjects use
that information to create a list from most preferred to least preferred. Digi-
tal photographs of subjects are taken at the beginning of the experiment, and
photographs are head shots, similar to a passport or identification photo.
Once all subjects submit their lists, groups are formed in four steps. First,
one person is chosen at random. A group is formed that includes the randomly
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chosen person and her four best ranked partners. Second, one person from the
remaining 15 people who have not been assigned to a group is randomly chosen.
A group is formed with that person and her four best ranked partners from the
remaining people who have not been previously assigned to a group. Third, one
person from the remaining 10 people who have not been previously assigned to a
group is randomly chosen. The first four people on that persons list among the
remaining people are put in a group with that person. Fourth, anyone not already
assigned to a group is put in a group together. Subjects see a screen with the
information corresponding to the subjects in their new group and then play the
last 10 rounds with that group.
This mechanism is similar to the one suggested in Bogomolnaia and Jackson
(2002). The mechanism is incentive compatible if preferences over groups are ad-
ditive in the preferences over its members.2 It would also be incentive compatible,
regardless of preferences over groups, if people are able to rank all possible groups
that one could be paired with. Unfortunately, this option would be impractical
since the number of groups to be ranked would be exceedingly large.3
There are four experimental treatments: Contribution Only, Photo Only, Con-
tribution and Photo, and Two Types. Treatments differ in the αi assigned to each
person and the information that is shown to subjects when they are asked to rank
the other subjects.
In the Contribution Only, Photo Only and Contribution and Photo treatments,
all subjects are assigned an αi = 1 cent. This means that the effective price of con-
tributing to the public good is p = 2 cents. In the Contribution Only treatment,
when subjects are asked to rank others, they see the average amount contributed
to the public good in the second 10-round sequence by all other subjects in the
room. In the Photo Only treatment, subjects see the photos of all other subjects.
And, in the Contribution and Photo treatment, subjects see the photo and the
average amount contributed to the public good in the second 10-round sequence.
The average is listed below each subject’s respective photo.
In the Two Types treatment, αi ∈ {0.25 cent, 2.5 cents}. Half of the subjects
are randomly assigned a value of 0.25 cent and half are randomly assigned a value
2Additivity in this context means that if James prefers Jill’s company to Jane’s company,
then James always prefers a group than exchanges Jane by Jill, regardless of who the other
members of the group are. Under these conditions, revealing the ordering of others is a weakly
dominant strategy for James. If James is not chosen, he is indifferent in the ranking he reveals.
If he is chosen, he is better off by revealing his true rankings. Since preferences over others’
company is additive, it does not matter whether he is chosen first or last.
3In a session of 20 subjects, each subject would need to rank 3,876 possible groups.
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of 2.5 cents. Subjects keep the same value for all 30 rounds of play. A subject
with an αi = 0.25 cent has a price of giving of p = 8 cents, making investment in
the public good very expensive. A subject with an αi = 2.5 cents has a price of
giving of p = 0.8 cent and should invest her entire endowment in the public good.
We expect subjects assigned the low value to invest little to nothing in the public
good. We expect subjects with a high value to invest all of their endowment in
the public good. Since types are randomly assigned to subjects and each type has
a completely different predicted contribution level, there is no correlation between
personal characteristics and contribution levels. If subjects in this treatment are
ranked according to gender or race, then this must be taste-based discrimination.4
The Contribution Only and Two Types treatments were run twice. The Photo
Only and Contribution and Photo treatments were run three times. Each exper-
imental session had 20 subjects. An experimental session lasted one hour and a
half. In total, 200 subjects participated in the four treatments. Subjects were
recruited from introductory courses in economics and political science.5 All ex-
periments were run in the computer lab at the Experimental Economics Center
(EXCEN) at Georgia State University.6
Fifty-four percent of the subjects are women. For race, 44.5% are self-classified
as African American or Black, 32.5% are Caucasian or White, 8.0% are Indian,
6.5% are Asian (not Indian), and 8.5% are other categories (this includes His-
panics, Mulatos, one Arab, and one Pakistani).7 Because of few observations
in groups other than Black and White, we collapse all the non-black, non-white
groups into one group called Other. All the main results in the paper hold if the
groups combined into the Other category are disaggregated into Indian, Asian
and other categories. Average age is 21.0 years (standard deviation 3.8 years). In
the Contribution Only, Photo Only, and Contribution and Photo treatments, av-
erage payoffs are $21.97 (standard deviation $2.63). In the Two Types treatment,
average payoffs are $47.13 (standard deviation $11.12).
4As mentioned in the introduction, given that future performance is measured with error
(i.e., by previous contributions), it is possible that personal characteristics still play a role in the
ranking decision. This implication is testable, however, given the data our experiments collect.
5Almost all students take these courses at some point in their undergraduate career (either
as a required course or one that satisfies a general education requirement), so the course is filled
with a variety of majors.
6Georgia State University is a racially-diverse, urban campus in Atlanta.
7We checked both gender and race self-classifications made by the subjects to ensure that
there were no obvious misclassifications. There were not.
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3. Instrument Check
To test whether our experimental design yields results similar to previous research
on repeated linear public goods games, we look at the average contribution across
the three treatments where the price of giving is 2 (Contribution Only, Photo
Only, Contribution and Photo). Subjects played two 10-round sequences of the
public goods game with two different randomly assigned groups. In the first se-
quence (when subjects are inexperienced), the average contribution is 32.8% of the
endowment over all ten rounds. This is similar to that of Andreoni (1988), 33.2%,
and to Croson (1996), 35.7%, both of whom also use inexperienced subjects, main-
tain subjects in the same group, and have a price of giving of 2. Contributions also
show a steady downward trend over the 10 rounds. Average contributions start
out at 41.6% in the first round and decline to 23.9% in the tenth round. The last
rounds are slightly higher than 11.6% in Andreoni and 18.2% in Croson. Subjects
in our experiment knew they were playing three 10-round sequences, so the last
round in the first sequence was not the last round of the experiment. Subjects in
Andreoni and Croson’s experiments thought they would only play 10 rounds in
total.
The average contribution and trend behavior from our standard public goods
game is similar to previous work. We conclude that our instrument is good and
proceed to looking at behavior across treatments.
4. Results
We would like to know if people discriminate by gender or race when sorting into
groups and if that discrimination is statistical or taste-based. To do so, we need
to first look at behavior by gender and race and then at how people rank others.
Finally, we look at who does relatively better when people sort into groups.
4.1. Average Behavior
Table 1 shows a random-effects regression of the percent contributed to the public
good in sequence 2, controlling for gender, race, gender/race interaction terms,
round, individual effects and group effects. For race, we use a dummy variable
for Blacks and a dummy variable called Other which includes all non-white, non-
black groups. The omitted category is white women. As discussed in the previous
section, we combine all the non-white, non-black subjects into one group because
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of the limited number of observations per group. Our main results are the same
if we further disaggregate the Other group into separate categories, including
Indians, Asians and the remaining in one group. The second column in Table 1
shows the results from the Contribution Only, Photo Only and Contribution and
Photo treatments. Columns 3 shows results from the Two Types treatment. We
look first at column 2.
Table 1
Dependent Variable: Percent Contributed in Sequence 2
Random-Effect Regression
Combined Treatments
(Contribution Only, Photo Only,
and Contribution & Photo) Two Types
Constant 33.34 -11.33
(0.000) (0.439)
Male -1.09 9.70
(0.838) (0.374)
Black -8.71 9.72
(0.042) (0.493)
Other -12.76 7.30
(0.033) (0.562)
Black*Male -1.25 -21.92
(0.845) (0.200)
Other*Male 3.81 -3.78
(0.644) (0.828)
High Type 62.40
(0.000)
Round -2.43 0.34
(0.000) (0.266)
Group Effects yes yes
Individual Effects yes yes
within-R2 0.10 0.00
N 1600 400
p-values in parentheses
Blacks and Others contribute 8-12 percentage points less than Whites. There
are no gender effects on contributions. Contributions decline 2.4 percentage points
per round. These results are robust to alternative specifications, including OLS
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with clustered errors and random-effects Tobit. Also, if we average contributions
across all rounds for individuals in sequence two and compare across race and
gender, both rank-sum and t-tests come to the same conclusions.
Looking at the Two Types treatment in Table 1, the percent contributed for
those who were assigned a high type is 62.4 percentage points higher than those
who were assigned a low type. There are no round effects. High types do con-
tribute significantly more than low types across all racial and gender groups, and
it is this divergence that is key to our ability to distinguish between statistical
and taste-based discrimination. Note that high types did not contribute 100% as
the theory would predict. We discuss this further in the next section.
Given contributions in Photo Only, Contribution Only, and Contribution and
Photo, we would expect Blacks and Others to be ranked lower since they con-
tribute the least. We do not expect women and men to be ranked differently.
4.2. Ranking
In the experiments, we allow people to rank who they would like to have in their
group for further rounds of investments so we can see if past behavior (percent
contributed to the public good), gender, and race affect ranking. The different
treatments allow us to tease apart differences in ranking due to past performance
and due to the gender and race of the person being ranked. Each person ranked
the other nineteen subjects in order frommost preferred to least preferred as fellow
group members. We use fixed-effects regressions to see how the rank received is
affected by the gender and race of the person being ranked as well as the past
performance.
As mentioned in section 2, treatments Contribution Only, Contribution and
Photos and Two Types revealed subjects average past contributions. However,
contributions are not strictly comparable across experimental sessions due to the
fact that the distribution of average contributions varied across sessions for any
treatment. An average contribution of 10 tokens may be the highest average
contribution in one session but the median average contribution in another session.
To make comparisons across sessions meaningful, we use the subject’s expected
rank for that session’s distribution of contributions. So, if a subject had the
highest average contribution, her expected rank would be one, and if it was the
lowest, it would be nineteen. Ties were assigned the average rank.
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Table 2
Dependent Variable: Rank (1=Highest, 19=Lowest)
Fixed-Effects Regression
Contribution Photo Contribution &
Only Only Photo Two Types
constant 0.85 8.71 1.14 1.46
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
expected rank 0.92 0.90 0.86
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
male 0.57 -0.12 -0.20
(0.320) (0.630) (0.578)
black 2.23 -0.21 -0.37
(0.000) (0.373) (0.369)
other -0.48 -0.41 0.04
(0.517) (0.244) (0.928)
black*male 0.15 0.24 0.47
(0.843) (0.480) (0.408)
other*male -0.48 0.20 0.24
(0.632) (0.652) (0.631)
Individual Effects yes yes yes yes
within-R2 0.84 0.06 0.80 0.75
N 760 1140 1140 760
Note: p-values in parentheses.
Table 2 reports fixed-effects regressions of ranking on expected rank, gender,
race, and gender/race interaction terms. The omitted gender/race category is
white women. Because ranks went from one to nineteen, with one being the
highest rank, a lower rank means that the person was more preferred to be in a
group. Regressions include fixed effects on the person doing the ranking since each
individual ranked 19 people. All results are robust to alternative specifications.8
We present the fixed-effects regressions because of the ease of interpreting the
parameters. Regressions are run separately for each treatment. The Contribution
Only treatment allows us to see if past performance alone affects rank. The Photo
8The results are the same if we use random-effects Tobit, OLS regressions with standard errors
clustered on the individual doing the ranking, rank-ordered logit, and fixed-effect regressions
with dummies for the group the person being ranked was in in the sequence two. This last
regression assures us that the group the subject was randomly assigned to in sequence two had
no effect on rankings.
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Only treatment shows if people discriminate based on race and gender, and the
Contribution and Photo and Two Types treatments show how rank is affected
when both performance and physical characteristics are known.
Looking at the results for the Contribution Only and Photo Only treatments,
we confirm that, in general, it is difficult to identify the separate effect of personal
characteristics on sorting. In Contribution Only, subjects only saw past average
contributions when ranking. Not surprisingly, ranking is strongly affected by the
subject’s expected rank. The relationship is not quite one to one, but it is very
close. A one rank increase in predicted rank increases a person’s actual rank by
0.92.
Considering the contribution regression results reported in Table 1, even when
no personal characteristics were revealed to subjects in the Contribution Only
treatment, ex-post groups would likely be segregated by race. Indeed, this is
the case. Using the Contribution Only data and regressing rank on personal
characteristics of the person being ranked, Blacks and Others are ranked lower.
This is the identification problem.
In Photo Only, subjects only saw pictures of the other subjects when rank-
ing. They did not know what any other subject contributed on average. In this
treatment, black subjects are ranked 2.2 ranks lower, but Others are ranked no
lower than Whites. The result on Blacks is robust to alternative specifications.9
Recall that both Blacks and Others gave significantly less on average and should
be ranked lower if ranking is solely a function of performance. That Others are
not ranked lower may be a function of misaligned expectations on their behavior.
We will see later that if that is the case, they are re-aligned with information on
performance.
Not everyone agrees on the rankings in Photo Only. Table 3 shows regressions
of rank on personal characteristics for different groups of rankers in the Photo
Only treatment. Table 3 looks at broad categories of the data to have sufficient
observations. Conditioning on the gender or race of the person doing the ranking,
we find that both men and women rank Blacks lower. Looking at race, there are
differences. Blacks do rank Others higher than Whites or Blacks, and Whites rank
Blacks 4.9 ranks lower. Blacks and Others do not rank Blacks lower.
This result is remarkable and shows that information is not equally important
(or used in the same way) for everyone. Indeed, for Whites, the characteristics
9Similar results hold if we run the regressions and interact race and gender with predicted
rank. If we classify people as Black, Asian, Indian or Other, with the omitted category being
White, the same results hold. Blacks are still ranked at least two ranks lower.
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of others explains 16% of the variation in ranking, but for Blacks, it only ex-
plains 4%. That is, Whites use the information on personal characteristics more
than Blacks.10 The regression in Table 2 hides this. This evidence alone cannot
distinguish the sources of discrimination. The results are consistent with white
subjects discriminating against black subjects, perhaps statistically. But, it is
also consistent with an in-group hypothesis that black subjects favor other black
subjects, since the payoff-maximizing strategy, given the results shown in Table
1, is to rank black and non-white, non-black subjects lower.
Table 3
Dependent Variable: Rank (1=Highest, 19=Lowest)
Photo Only Treatment
Fixed-Effects Regressions
Men Women Whites Blacks Others
constant 8.33 9.04 7.17 9.73 9.00
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
male 1.96 -0.54 1.25 0.62 -1.08
(0.024) (0.483) (0.177) (0.456) (0.477)
black 2.23 2.27 4.96 0.69 1.05
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.329) (0.387)
other 0.10 -0.98 0.66 -2.44 2.95
(0.928) (0.321) (0.593) (0.019) (0.120)
black*male -0.91 0.94 -1.03 0.23 2.53
(0.407) (0.348) (0.389) (0.829) (0.176)
other*male -1.69 0.48 -0.67 0.27 -2.13
(0.257) (0.717) (0.687) (0.847) (0.417)
Individual Effects yes yes yes yes yes
within-R2 0.05 0.07 0.16 0.04 0.05
N 532 608 380 570 190
Note: p-values in parentheses.
Is the observed differential ranking by race in Photo Only due to taste-based
discrimination? We cannot ascertain this from the regression results alone. The
results from Contribution Only clearly indicate that people want higher contribu-
tors in their group. If Blacks and Others contribute less on average, then we would
10Eckel and Petrie (2006) found a similar result, in that Whites were more willing to buy the
photo of their partner in a trust game and they were more likely to use the personal character-
istics in the photo to differentiate their trust.
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expect them to be ranked lower. Because race is correlated with contributions, we
cannot determine if the differential ranking in Photo Only is because people know
who are the high and low contributors or because they do not like a particular
group. That is, without assuming that subjects have rational expectations, we
cannot distinguish why people use the information this way.
The treatments Contribution and Photo and Two Types permit us to see how
personal characteristics affect ranking when information on performance is also
provided. In the Two Types treatment, performance is uncorrelated with personal
characteristics by design.
Looking at the results in the Contribution and Photo and Two Types treat-
ments in Table 2, we see that when both photos and past performance are known,
the only significant predictor of how people are ranked is their past performance.
An increase by one of predicted rank increases actual rank by 0.90 in Contribu-
tion and Photo and by 0.87 in Two Types. The results from the Contribution
and Photo treatment suggest that the differential ranking by race observed in
the Photo Only treatment is due to statistical discrimination. The Two Types
treatment confirms this.
In the Two Types treatment, past performance and race are no longer corre-
lated. Each type was randomly assigned to subjects. If there is any differential
ranking in this treatment, it must be due to taste-based discrimination. We see in
Table 2 that this is not the case.11 Finally, it is interesting to see that black sub-
jects do not use the information efficiently in the Photos Only treatment. Barring
taste-based discrimination, they overestimate the performance of black subjects
and non-white, non-black subjects.
4.3. Efficiency
The results thus far give evidence for statistical discrimination in how people rank
others. We would also like to know how sorting affects payoffs and efficiency. After
subjects submitted their rankings of others, four groups were formed. Group 1
is the first group formed, and Group 4 is the last group formed. Because the
group formation mechanism forms groups in order, Group 1 is more likely to be
composed of the most preferred people and Group 4 of the least preferred. Indeed,
11This is further confirmed by looking at the extremes of behavior. Recall that not all high
types gave 100% of their endowment, and not all low types were free riders. So, there was some
variation in behavior by high types and by low types. Looking at individuals whose average
contribution was 25 tokens or 0 tokens, we still find no evidence of differential ranking by gender
or race.
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the average rank of people in Group 1 is higher than that of people in Group 2,
and so on, for all treatments. Once groups are formed, subjects played another
ten rounds with the selected group.
Looking at payoffs first, Table 4 shows the average payoff in each group when
groups were randomly assigned and when they were chosen. The first panel shows
payoffs in each treatment in sequence 2, when groups were randomly assigned.
The last row in the panel shows the difference between the highest and lowest
average payoff for the treatment. This difference is between $1.52-$1.65 in the
first three treatments and $8.56 in the Two Types treatment. Comparing this to
the second panel, which shows payoffs in sequence 3 when groups were chosen,
there is a much larger difference when groups are chosen. The difference in highest
and lowest payoffs ranges between $2.18-$3.70 for the first three treatments and
is $26.23 in the Two Types treatment.
Table 4
Average Payoff per Person for Entire Sequence by Group
Random Groups (Sequence 2)
Contribution Photo Contribution &
Only Only Photo Two Types
Group 1 7.75 7.11 6.33 10.88
Group 2 6.45 6.35 6.82 16.64
Group 3 7.77 7.94 7.98 13.83
Group 4 6.24 6.49 7.14 19.44
Highest - Lowest 1.52 1.59 1.65 8.56
Chosen Groups (Sequence 3)
Contribution Photo Contribution &
Only Only Photo Two Types
Group 1 7.66 9.54 9.65 31.14
Group 2 7.73 6.57 8.26 23.20
Group 3 5.94 8.03 7.08 7.82
Group 4 5.55 7.00 5.95 4.92
Highest - Lowest 2.18 2.97 3.70 26.23
These differences show that there is increasing income inequality when people
are allowed to sort into groups. The difference between the lowest average indi-
vidual payoff in a group and the highest increases by 33%-300% when people are
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allowed to choose groups. This is significant in all treatments but Contribution
Only.12 The increase in inequality is due to changes on both ends of the distri-
bution. The lowest payoff declines and the highest increases, except in the Con-
tribution Only treatment. Similar results hold if we compare the first sequence,
instead of the second sequence, to the third, and there is no significant difference
between lowest and highest payoff from sequence one to sequence two. This means
that the income inequality comes from sorting, not necessarily learning.
Table 5
Average Money Generated in a Session by Sequence and Treatment
Contribution Photo Contribution &
Only Only Photo Two Types Total
Random Groups (Seq 2) 141.07 139.47 141.36 303.94 725.83
Chosen Groups (Seq 3) 134.34 155.66 154.73 335.43 780.15
Percentage change -5% 12% 9% 10% 7%
Does this increase in income inequality from sorting also imply a loss of effi-
ciency? Not necessarily. Table 5 shows the average amount of money generated
in an experimental session when groups are randomly assigned and when groups
are chosen. Overall, allowing people to sort into groups generates more money
across the treatment sessions. The overall amount generated increases by 7%.
The biggest gains come in sessions where subjects can see the photograph of their
fellow group members. In these sessions, the money generated increases by 9-12%.
There is a net decrease in Contribution Only. Thus, while sorting does increase
income inequality across subjects in different groups, it does not necessarily de-
crease efficiency in the session. The overall amount of money generated decreases
slightly from sequence one to sequence two, but there is a still a net gain in money
generated comparing sequence one to sequence three. This further confirms that
the efficiency gains are due to sorting and not learning per se.
We have seen an important difference in how people are ranked by others
based on race. Does this differential ranking also imply that people make differ-
ent amounts of money in the last ten rounds? Looking at the difference between
payoffs for Whites and Blacks, Blacks do make significantly less money in the
12An interquantile regression between the 10th and 90th percentle shows a significantly larger
dispersion of payoffs when playing with a chosen group in all treatments but Contribution Only.
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Contribution Only and Photo Only treatments, but there is no significant differ-
ence in payoffs in the Contribution & Photo and Two Types treatments.13 While
Blacks make less money in the first two treatments, they are also more likely to
be in Group 4 in those treatments. Everyone in Group 4 makes less money than
those in Group 1.14
Conditioning on being in the top group, however, the percentage gain in income
from being in a randomly assigned group to being in a chosen group does not differ
between Blacks and Whites. The gain in income is 0-5% in Contribution Only,
55-58% in Photo Only, 24-36% in Contribution and Photo, and 102-104% in Two
Types. That is, once someone makes it to the most preferred group, payoffs are
similar. This means that the difference in payoff from sorting is not necessarily
due to personal characteristics but to the group one belongs to.
Where do these efficiency gains come from? Table 6 shows the percentage
change in contributions from sequence 2 to sequence 3. In the treatments where
photos are shown, there is an increasing differentiation in behavior. Members of
Group 1 change their behavior the most, whereas Group 4 changes their behavior
the least. There is a significant increase in contribution behavior in Group 1
in Photo Only and Contribution and Photo.15 There is no significant change in
behavior in the Two Types treatment, but in the top group, there was little room
for change since most were already contributing close to their full endowment.
This shows that it is not sorting per se that changes behavior but seeing who is
in one’s group.16
13The p-value for the Wilcoxon rank sum test for difference in payoffs in Contribution Only
is 0.0266, in Photo Only is 0.0670, in Contribution and Photo is 0.3530, and in Two Types is
0.7505.
14Recall that subjects were not told whether they were in the first group or the last group.
We use this classification for expositional purposes only.
15A regression on the average change in contributions from being in a randomly-assigned
group to a chosen group is regressed on dummy variables for each group for the last 10-round
sequence.
16Andreoni and Petrie (2004) found a similar result in that individual contributions to the
public good increased significantly only when group members could identify other group mem-
bers.
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Table 6
Change in Individual Budget Share Contributions
from Sequence 2 to Sequence 3
Contribution Photo Contribution &
Only Only Photo Two Types
Group 1 -5% 28% 18% 7%
Group 2 0% -4% 10% 15%
Group 3 -10% 14% 6% 2%
Group 4 -3% 5% 1% 3%
4.4. Preferred Partners and Contribution Behavior
Contribution behavior in the chosen group may also be affected by whether a
person was in a group with preferred partners. It might be the case that an
individual is more cooperative in a group with people she wanted to be with. We
find some evidence to support this hypothesis only in the Contribution and Photo
treatment. In all treatments, conditioning on a person’s own average rank, the
average rank of all group members, and the average contribution in the previous
ten rounds, we find that past behavior significantly explains average contributions
in the final ten rounds in all treatments.17 If we include variables on the gender
or race composition of the group, these variables do not explain contribution
behavior.
In the Contribution and Photo treatment, however, people do also contribute
more if they are in a more-preferred group. As the average ranking of all group
members increases by one, average contributions increase by 1.14 tokens. This
means that people increase their cooperation in groups they want to be in and
decrease their contributions when they are with people they do not want to be
with.
5. Conclusion
We present a new experimental design that permits us to analyze the nature and
consequence of discrimination in group formation and cooperation. Our design
allows us to cleanly distinguish between statistical and taste-based discrimination
17The correlation between expected rank from average behavior in sequence 2 and expected
rank from average behavior in sequence 3 is ρ =0.85. This suggests that past contributions were
a good predictor of future behavior.
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within the same game by manipulating the information made available to subjects
and by breaking the correlation between performance and personal characteristics.
Subjects play a repeated linear public goods game and are allowed to rank others
as potential group members for the last ten rounds of play. We systematically vary
the information available for ranking. Either subjects see the past performance
of others, the photo, or both. A final treatment randomly assigns either a low or
high price of giving so that contribution behavior is not correlated with a person’s
gender or race. Any differential ranking of others by gender or race must be due
to taste-based discrimination.
We find that there is differential ranking of others by personal characteristics,
but this discrimination is mainly statistical and clear incentives/signals eliminate
it. Our design is robust in distinguishing statistical from taste-based discrimina-
tion. While we find no evidence of taste-based discrimination in this study, we
do in a non-student population in Peru (Castillo, Petrie and Torero, 2006). Be-
cause payoffs in public goods games are increasing in the contributions of others,
a payoff-maximizing individual would do best by choosing cooperative people to
be in her group. This is precisely what we find. Past performance is a consistently
strong predictor of how someone is ranked by others.
Absent information on past performance, though, do subjects use personal
characteristics to rank others? We find that they do. The most consistent result
is that black subjects are ranked lower than others when past performance is
unknown. We find some evidence consistent with in-group/out-group behavior in
this ranking, as only white subjects rank Blacks lower.
This differential ranking cannot be attributed to taste-based discrimination.
Both black and non-white, non-black subjects contribute less than any other
group, although the latter group is not ranked lower. Because contribution behav-
ior and personal characteristics are correlated (or thought to be), from this result
alone we cannot determine if this is due to statistical or taste-based discrimination.
Once we control for performance and personal characteristics, the only expla-
nation for how one is ranked is past performance. This result is strongly con-
firmed with our last treatment that breaks the correlation between performance
and characteristics. This implies that observed discrimination in the absence of
information on performance is statistical. Also, given clear signals of performance,
any discrimination is eliminated.
There are efficiency gains to sorting but at the expense of income equality. By
allowing people to choose their groups, there is a 7% increase in money generated
in the experiment. The largest gains happen in the treatments where people can
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identify their fellow group members. At the same time that efficiency increases
with sorting, there is increasing income inequality between the most-preferred
and least-preferred groups. That is, while the experimental economy as a whole
benefits by allowing people to sort into groups, there are people who clearly benefit
relatively more than others.
We find no evidence that personal characteristics affect payoffs for those in
the most-preferred group. Blacks do earn less than Whites when there is sorting,
but that difference disappears when subjects know past performance and see the
person’s picture. Indeed, the gains in earnings for being in the top group are no
different between Blacks and Whites.
Our results suggest that people do hold perceptions about others based on
their personal characteristics. And, it appears that people use them as a basis
to sort into groups. Information on personal characteristics, however, is used
differently by different groups. Blacks disregard personal information, even when
they should not, and Whites seem to use this information more.
It remains to be learned why black and certain non-white, non-black subjects
consistently contribute less. It may be an expression of difference in expecta-
tions across subjects and suggests that heterogeneity in behavior and beliefs is
important in our sample.
Mechanisms that give clear signals on performance, though, eliminate any
evidence of differentiation. This is good news for policy makers who may be
seeking institutions that diminish discrimination. The best results are obtained,
however, when incentives are strong. In that case, there is no real difference in
performance and therefore no risk in perpetuating inequality. The challenge is
how to design mechanisms in ways that are believable and efficient.
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